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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY
A. The District Court Erred in Not Dismissing the Case or Disqualifying
the Ada County Prosecuting Attorney from Prosecuting the Case. The
Proper Remedy on Appeal is Dismissal.
The state first contends that “[t]he remedy fashioned by the district court is
consistent with Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 932, 801 P.2d 1283 (1990), and State v.
Martinez, 102 Idaho 875, 643 P.2d 555 (Ct. App. 1982).” Respondent’s Brief, pg. 7.
That is incorrect. In Stuart, the Supreme Court required the prosecutor “to show
that the evidence at trial had an origin independent of the eavesdropping,” noting
that, [a]ny knowledge wrongfully gained by the government cannot be used against
a defendant.” 118 Idaho at 935, 801 P.2d at 1286, citing Nardone v. United States,
308 U.S. 338 (1939) (emphasis added). Here, however, the district court did not
require the state to show an independent source. And although the state claimed
that it was able to do so, there is no evidence in the record to support that claim
because the district court relieved them of that burden. In fact, the “remedy” in this
case is contrary to Stuart because the court relieved the state of its burden to show
an independent source and instead placed the burden on Mr. Robins to object
whenever “the defense believes that the prosecution is offering evidence or
argument that could only have been obtained by way of [the] notes.” R 303.
This burden-shifting is not only inconsistent with Stuart, it is illogical. The
court instructed Mr. Robins to object when the prosecution was offering evidence or
argument that could only be obtained by way of the note. Of course, that ignores
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the possibility that the prosecution might present evidence or argument for which
there could be an independent source but also could have been obtained from the
note. In that case, Stuart requires that the state bear the burden of showing the
evidence has an independent source. So, by limiting the defense objection to
instances where there could not have been an independent source, the court
prevented Mr. Robins from objecting in cases where the source of the information
was not clear. But even the cases cited by the state recognize that it is the state’s
burden of proof to show the absence of prejudice in such cases. See State’s Brief, pg.
19, citing, State v. Warner, 722 P.2d 291, 296 (Ariz .1986) (“[W]e believe the
appropriate remedy in this case is to remand for a hearing to determine how, if at
all, defendant was prejudiced by the state's intrusion, with the burden on the state
to prove defendant was accorded a fair trial.”). The trial court abused its discretion
by shifting the burden to Mr. Robins because it did not act consistently with the
applicable legal standards. Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 848, 243 P.3d 642,
664 (2010).
Martinez, supra, is not apposite to this case because “[n]one of the
information gathered through surveillance of Martinez’s mail or phone calls was
used as evidence in his trial.” 102 Idaho at 879, 643 P.2d at 559. Here, we do not
know whether any evidence was used because the court never made the state prove
an independent source.
Moreover, neither Stuart nor Martinez address the additional problem

2

present here. The note contained more than potential evidence. It also contained
notes and thoughts on “potential defense strategies,” which gave the state an unfair
“inside look as to how Mr. Robins views his case and his defense.” R 302. In this
regard, Mr. Robins’ argument based upon United States v. Danielson, 325 F.3d 1054
(9th Cir. 2003), is not addressed by the state. Instead, it again attempts to shift the
burden to Mr. Robins to identify “an[] actual strategy . . . the state became privy to
as a result of its acquisition of his notes.” State’s Brief, pg. 10. But that is an
impossible task, because as the Danielson Court observed: “In cases where wrongful
intrusion results in the prosecution obtaining the defendant’s trial strategy . . . it
will often be unclear whether, and how, the prosecution’s improperly obtained
information about the defendant’s trial strategy may have been used, and whether
there was prejudice. . . . . The prosecution team knows what it did. The defendant
can only guess.” Id., at 1070. Further, the state fails to take into account the
district court’s finding that the notes revealed potential defense strategies. R 302.
Thus, Mr. Robins made a prima facie case that confidential communications were
conveyed to the prosecution through the affirmative intrusion into the attorneyclient relationship.
Under Danielson, “once the prima facie case has been established, ‘the
burden shifts to the government to show that there has been . . . no prejudice to the
defendant[] as a result of these communications.’” 325 F.3d at 1071, quoting, United
States v. Mastroianni, 749 F.2d 900, 908 (1st Cir. 1984). Prejudice can come from
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either direct and indirect use of the knowledge, this includes more than just what
evidence the state presents during the trial and can be assistance in focusing the
investigation, deciding to initiate the prosecution, refusing to plea bargain,
interpreting evidence, planning cross-examination, and otherwise generally
planning trial strategy. See, United States v. Crowson, 828 F.2d 1427, 1430 (9th Cir.
1987).
The state’s reliance on United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361 (1981), is also
misplaced. That case, unlike here, involved a pre-trial motion which did not allege
that the prosecutor was aware of any attorney-client privileged communications.
Id., at 363. Federal agents met with Ms. Morrison after she had retained counsel
seeking her cooperation in a related investigation. She declined to cooperate and
notified her attorney. The agents visited her again and she again refused to
cooperate with them. She did not incriminate herself, supply any information
pertinent to her case, or reveal attorney-client confidences. 449 U.S. at 362.
Thus, the defendant did not show that the government was aware of any
information obtained by a wrongful intrusion into the attorney-client relationship.
Here, the prosecutor was aware of such information.
The same is true in Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 548 (1977), the
other Supreme Court case cited by the state. The prosecution did not gain any
advantage from the violation of attorney-client confidentiality. While a government
undercover agent was present at meetings between the attorney and client, “[a]t no
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time did [he] discuss with or pass on to his superiors or to the prosecuting attorney
or any of the attorney’s staff any details or information regarding the plaintiff's trial
plans, strategy, or anything having to do with the criminal action pending against
plaintiff.” Id., 548 (internal quotations omitted). The same distinction holds true
for State v. Russum, 333 P.3d 1191, 1194 (Or. App. 2014), and Brown v.
Commonwealth, 416 S.W.3d 302, 307 (Ky. 2013), also cited by the state.1
By contrast, the prosecutor here obtained and read Mr. Robins’ note. Mr.
Robins made a prima facie showing of prejudice as the trial court found the
prosecution obtained both evidence and knowledge of defense strategies. R 302.
The burden then shifted to the prosecutor to show the absence of prejudice pursuant
to United States v. Danielson, supra.
In addition, Morrison is distinguishable from this case because the dismissal
with prejudice there was made pre-trial, when lesser measures were still available
to the court. Here the district court could have fashioned an effective remedy well
short of dismissal by, for example, disqualifying the Ada County Prosecuting
Attorney’s Office and requiring the case to be turned over to an independent
prosecutor who had never seen the notes. But now, as explained in State v. Cory,
382 P.2d 1019, 1022 (Wash. 1963) and United States v. Levy, 577 F.2d 200, 210 (3rd
Cir. 1978), there is no way to isolate the prejudice resulting from an invasion of the
1

Another case cited by the state, Haworth v. State, 840 P.2d 912 (Wy. 1992),
is an order denying a petition for rehearing. The Wyoming Court’s opinion in the
case is apparently unpublished. Haworth v. State, No. 90-276, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS
151 (Oct. 22, 1992).
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attorney-client privilege once the case has gone to trial.
Now that the trial has taken place, a new trial does not afford an effective
remedy because the prosecutor in a second trial will still benefit from the original
violation as the fruits of the violation are now in the public record. However, in the
alternative, if a new trial is ordered, the case must be tried by a prosecutor outside
the Ada County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office. And that new prosecutor must
present proof that every piece of evidence and every strategic decision has a genesis
completely independent of Ada County’s intrusion into the attorney-client
relationship, including evidence that she has not reviewed Ada County files or the
trial transcripts.
B. The District Court Erred by Denying the Motion to Sever Defendants and
by Admitting Exhibit 133 at Trial over Objection.
1. The court abused its discretion
Mr. Robins argues that the court abused its discretion in denying the motion
to sever because it admitted the Douglas letter in toto without individualized
consideration of the many statements to determine which fell within the hearsay
exception, contrary to State v. Averett, 142 Idaho at 890-91, 136 P.3d at 361-62.
Had the court followed the procedure mandated by Averett, it would have only
admitted Mr. Douglas’s admission that “I bodyed them dudes[.]” Exhibit 133.
To this, the state argues that “context matters.” State’s Brief, pg. 25. But, as
previously argued, the statement that there is “no need both of us going down”
when taken in context is not an admission of guilt, but rather a recognition by Mr.
6

Douglas of the very strong case against him. In context, the statement that Mr.
Robins did not need to “go down” did not incriminate Mr. Douglas in any way.
Neither statement was against Mr. Douglas’s penal interests.
2. The error is not harmless
Since objected-to error has occurred, the state bears the burden of proving
harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 218, 245
P.3d 961, 970 (2010). The entirety of the state’s argument in this regard is the bare
assertion that “any error in its admission was harmless in light of the evidence
presented at trial supporting the jury’s verdicts finding Robins guilty of aiding and
abetting Douglas in the murders of Elliott Bailey and Travonte Calloway, and the
attempted murder of Jeanette Juraska. (See, e.g., Exhibits 97-99 (phone records);
1/22/2016 Tr., pp.26-137 (Juraska’s testimony); 1/25/2016 Tr., pp.6-192 (Raider’s
testimony).)” State’s Brief, pg. 26. That is a conclusion, not an argument and does
not meet the state’s burden of proof. “A party waives an issue cited on appeal if
either authority or argument is lacking[.]” State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923
P.2d 966, 970 (1996).
In addition to not offering any argument, the state never even summarizes its
trial evidence. Its “Statement Of The Facts and Course Of Proceedings,” is exactly
two paragraphs long, the second consisting of seven words. Neither paragraph
actually describes the evidence the state asserts shows the error was harmless. Nor
does it ever argue how the exclusion of the inadmissible portions of the letter could
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not have contributed to the verdict. Thus, the state’s claim of harmless error fails.
But even if the evidence is examined, the error cannot be deemed harmless.
First, the state’s citation to Ms. Juraska’s testimony does not aid its cause.
Ms. Juraska opened the door and saw Mr. Winn and Mr. Douglas. T (1/22/2016) pg.
40, ln. 12 - pg. 45, ln. 13. Ms. Juraska did not see Mr. Robins.
Second, the testimony of Anton Raider was highly dubious. Mr. Raider’s alibi
for the murder was that he was at his friends’ house where he “hung out and
smoked weed, just chilled.” T (1/25/2016) pg. 58, ln. 18 - pg. 61, ln. 12. Prior to
that, however, he admitted he was actively involved in the crime. Mr. Raider
suspected Bailey and Calloway were the thieves and agreed to sell his .45 caliber
handgun to Mr. Douglas, so Mr. Douglas could kill them. T (1/25/2016) pg. 41, ln. 423. He also went to Cabela’s to buy ammunition for the weapon. Exhibits 111-113.
He retrieved the pistol from his mom’s house, cleaned it, and help to load it. He
drove Mr. Winn and Mr. Douglas around to look for Bailey and Calloway prior to
the shooting. T (1/25/2016) pg. 48, ln. 5-12. He let his van be driven to the murder
scene. And while he denies being there, a neighbor, Matt Jamison, heard the
gunfire and saw a black man and a white man quickly leaving the scene. T
(1/19/2016) pg. 267, ln. 2 - pg. 268, ln. 2; pg. 293, 2-25; pg. 295, ln. 5-20. 156, ln. 14.
Mr. Raider is the only white person among the possible participants. Exhibits 73,
119. Mr. Jamison saw Mr. Raider’s van leaving. T (1/19/2016) pg. 270, ln. 2-14.
The next day, Mr. Raider located the van, went to the hardware store and
bought bleach, cleaned the interior of the van, “and then drove it to a car wash and
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pressure washed the inside of it.” T (1/25/2016) pg. 71, ln. 9-12; Exhibit 73. And
while Mr. Raider claimed he learned of the van’s location during a telephone call
with Mr. Robins, his cell phone records did not show that call. T (1/26/2016), pg. 74,
ln. 15 - pg. 75, ln. 22; Exhibits 76, C.
Mr. Raider did not immediately report the murders to the police, as a good
citizen would have done. It was not until he was charged in federal court with
possession of marijuana and with possession of a weapon in connection with a drug
crime, and had consulted with his Federal Public Defender, did he finger the others.
In exchange for his cooperation, he received a five-year sentence in federal court and
concurrent five-year sentence in state court. T (1/25/2016) pg. 76, ln. 6 - pg. 77, ln.
16; pg. 146, ln. 1-2. Thus, Mr. Raider literally got away with murder in exchange
for his testimony.
In short, the evidence excluding Mr. Douglas’s letter was not strong and
relied upon the untrustworthy testimony of Anton Raider, who had every reason to
place the blame on Mr. Robins for his own actions. The state has not shown the
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
III. CONCLUSION
Mr. Robins respectfully requests that this Court reverse his conviction and
dismiss. Alternatively, the Court should vacate his conviction and remand to the
district court for a new trial.
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Respectfully submitted this 6th day of October, 2017.
/s/Dennis Benjamin
Dennis Benjamin
Attorney for Anthony Robins
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